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“The Lord’s Work”: An Overview of CEQA’s Judicial 
Remedies and Recommendations for Reform 
 




The California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”)1 has its critics. Even 
Governor Jerry Brown once famously called CEQA reform “the Lord’s work.”2 
This is perhaps because, as noted by former Governors George Deukmejian, Pete 
Wilson, and Gray Davis: “CEQA lawsuits are frequently filed only to ext ract 
concessions not related to the environment, or for the purpose of opposing a project 
for reasons having nothing to do with environmental protection.”3 
Despite these criticisms, CEQA plays a vital role in protecting California’s 
environment and informing decision makers and the public of a proposed project’s 
environmental impacts. Public agencies a nd developers are all too familiar with 
CEQA mercenaries—lawyers or organizations that nitpick CEQA documents, 
looking to extract money or concessions in exchange for an agreement not to use 
CEQA as a cudgel against the project. Yet, as the effects of climate change ravage 
California,4 CEQA’s role has never been so important. The challenge lies in  
balancing CEQA’s noble purposes against the need for social, economic, and 
 
  Michelle Ouellette is a partner at Best Best & Krieger LLP. She was the recipient 
of the Daily Journal’s Environmental California Lawyer Attorney of the Year Award in  
2017, and a Daily Journal headline about Michelle once read, “Enough CEQA Wins to Fill 
a Bucket.” In her thirty year career, she has successfully litigated hundreds of CEQA cases 
and helped her clients proceed with hundreds of projects across California. 
  Ali Tehrani is an associate attorney at Best Best & Krieg er LLP. Ali li tigates 
CEQA issues on behalf of public agency and developer clients, reviews and drafts CEQA-
related documents, and helps his clients navigate through the CEQA process. 
1. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21000, et al (2018). 
2. Adrian Glick Kudler, There’s a Last Minute Rush to Completely Overhaul 
California’s Big Environmental Law, CURBED LOS ANGELES (Aug. 23 , 2012), 
https://perma.cc/6DCT-ZBC9. 
3. George Deukmejian, Pete  Wilson & Gra y Davis, Keep California green and 
golden with CEQA reforms, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (July 12, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/H9AN-Q8KV. 
4. Unprecedented wildfires, record heat, and crushing drought po se increasingly 
difficult challenges for the Golden State. Robinson Meyer, Why the Wildfires of 2018 Have 
Been So Ferocious, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/XL4N-478R. 
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technological development. CEQA itself recognizes the need to balance these 
interests.5 This article discusses how CEQA balances these interests in the context 
of judicial remedies. 
What happens when a court finds that a public agency has fallen short of 
fully complying with CEQA? Must the result be a crushing defeat for the public 
agency, the project proponent, and the public that stood to benefit from the project? 
Must the agency set aside its CEQA determination and its project approvals? Can 
the project move forward while the a gency seeks to comply with the writ o f 
mandate? As always with CEQA, it depends. These questions hinge, in part, on 
how courts exercise their substantial discretion to apply CEQA’s statutory judicial 
remedies.  
First, because judicial remedies should be narrowly tailored to fulfill 
CEQA’s objectives, this article ex amines CEQA’s purposes and how CEQA 
works. This article th en briefly discusses what a CEQA violation entails, since 
there is no exercise of a judicial remedy without a CEQA violation. A discussion 
of judicial remedies and the extent to which a court has discretion to require CEQA 
compliance without setting aside project approvals follows. Finally, this article will 
address “the Lord’s work”—common sense reforms that might reduce CEQA’s 
regulatory burden without sacrificing the statute’s objectives. 
 
II. How projects comply with CEQA and what courts must do 
upon finding noncompliance6 
 
CEQA is an environmental statute that generally applies to projects that (1) 
require discretionary approval from a California public agency, and (2) have the 
potential to result in d irect or reasonably foreseeable indirect impacts on th e 
physical environment.7 The primary way CEQA seeks to protect the environment 
is by requiring preparation of an environmental impact report (“EIR”) for a 
proposed project that “may have a significant effect on the environment.”8  
 
5. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15003(j) (1970). 
6. This is a ver y annotated discussion of CEQA’s complex statu tory scheme. The 
purpose of this section is merely to provide context. This discussion is not intended to 
provide a complete overview of CEQA, and it does  not address various nuances and 
exceptions to CEQA’s rules. 
7. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15378 (1970). 
8. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21151(a) (1977); see also Tomlinson v. City of Alameda, 
54 Cal. 4th 281, 286 (2012). A public agency need not necessarily prepare an EIR to comply 
with CEQA; indeed, there  are many means of CEQA com pliance. Depending on the 
circumstances, a public agency may comply with CEQA by determining that (1) a proposed 
activity does not qualify as a “project” subject  to CEQA; (2) the proposed activity qualifies 
as a “project,” but that the project is exempt from CEQA; (3) a negative declaration—rather 
than an EIR—is appropriate for a non-exempt project based on an initial study’s finding that 
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The EIR has been described as the “heart of CEQA.”9 In short, an EIR is a 
“detailed statement . . . describing and analyzing the si gnificant environmental 
effects of a pro ject and d iscussing ways to mitigate or avoid the effects.”10 Its 
purpose is “to inform the public and its responsible officials of the environmental 
consequences of their decisions before they are made.”11 An EIR is generally very 
extensive, expensive, and time consuming to prepare. For example, an EIR can be 
thousands of pages long, analyze dozens of potential environmental impacts,12 and 
include myriad technical appendices prepared by various consultants.  
A party seeking to challenge a public agency’s compliance with CEQA (e.g., 
by challenging the adequacy of an EIR) does so by filing a petition for a writ of 
mandate with a court.13 If a court finds that an agency’s determination, finding, or 
decision does not comply with CEQA, the court must enter an order, in the form 
of a peremptory writ of mandate, containing one or more of three specified 
mandates, which are further addressed in the discussion of Public Resources Code 
section 21168.9(a), below.14 
Once the court issues a writ of mandate, “[t]he trial co urt shall retain 
jurisdiction over the public agency’s proceedings by way of a return to th e 
 
there is not substantial evidence, in light of the whole of the record before the agenc y, that 
the project may have a significant effect on th e environment; (4) a “mitigated” negative 
declaration is appropriate where the initial study determines that a proposed project may have 
potentially significant effects, but the project applicant agrees to revise the project to eliminate 
or avoid those effects; or (5) an EIR must be prepared where the initial study determines that 
the proposed project may have a significant effect on the environment (Cal. Pub. Res. Code, 
§ 21151(a) (197 7); Tomlinson, 54 Cal. 4th  281). Additionall y, in certain circumstances, 
CEQA compliance may require the preparation of other documents, such as a supplemental 
EIR, a subsequent EIR, or an addendum to an EIR (Pub. Res. Co de, § 21166 (1972); Cal. 
Code Regs. tit. 14, §§ 15162, 15164 (1970).) Because this article concerns judicial remedies 
under CEQA—rather than a complete overview of CEQA itself—this article primarily  
focuses on EIRs for the sake of simplicity. However, the law, procedures, and questions raised 
in this article apply anytime a court determines that a public agency has prejudicially violated 
CEQA (e.g., when a court determines that a public agency improperly found a project exempt 
from CEQA or improperly prepared a negative declaration). 
9. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of University of California, 6 Cal. 
4th 1112, 1123 (1993). 
10. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15362 (1970). 
11. Id. 
12. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, Appendix G (1970) (listing various environmental 
impacts generally studied in an EIR). 
13. 1KOSTKA & ZISCHKE, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY ACT § 23.61 (Cont. Ed. Bar 2d ed. 2015).  
14. Pres. Wild Santee v. City of Santee, 210 Cal. App. 4th 260, 286 (2012); see also 
Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9 (2017). 
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peremptory writ until the court has determined that the public agency has complied 
with [CEQA].”15 
 
III. CEQA seeks to protect the environment and inform 
governmental decision makers, not hinder development 
 
To properly understand CEQA’s judicial remedies, one must first understand 
the purposes CEQA seeks to serve. When Governor Ronald Reagan signed CEQA 
into law in  1970,16 he di d not intend to obstruct development in California.17 
Indeed, the State CEQA Guidelines18 expressly provide that CEQA “must not be 
subverted into an instrument for the oppression and delay of social, economic or 
recreational development or advancement.”19 Rather,  
 
[t]he basic purposes of CEQA are to: 
(1)Inform governmental decision makers and the public about the 
potential, significant environmental effects of proposed activities. 
(2)Identify ways that environmental damage can be avoided or 
significantly reduced. 
(3)Prevent significant, avoidable damage to the environment by 
requiring changes in pr ojects through the use of alternatives or 
mitigation measures when the governmental agency finds the 
changes to be feasible. 
(4)Disclose to the public the reasons why a governmental agency 
approved the project in the manner the agency chose if significant 
environmental effects are involved.20 
 
 
15. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(b) (2017). 
16. CALIFORNIA NATURAL RESOURCES AGENCY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
ABOUT CEQA (2014), https://perma.cc/RR9R-3UJJ. 
17. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21000, 21001 (2018). 
18. The Guidelines for California Environmental Quality Act, also known as the 
State CEQA Guidelines, are codified in Title 14 of the C alifornia Code of R egulations, 
commencing at section 15000. The State CEQA Guidelines have been dev eloped by the 
Office of Planning and Research, and they are binding on all public agencies in California. 
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 (1970).) 
19. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15003(j) (1970); see also Maintain Our Desert Env’t v. 
Town of Apple Valley, 120 Cal. App. 4th 396, 447 (2004); Pres. Poway v. City of Poway, 
245 Cal. App. 4th 560, 581-582 (2016). 
20. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15002(a) (1970). 
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In sum, “CEQA’s purpose is to compel government to make decisions with 
environmental consequences in mind,” not to stop development.21 
 
IV. A CEQA violation must be “prejudicial” to warrant a 
judicial remedy 
 
Not every CEQA violation will lead a court to set aside a public agency’s 
CEQA document or project approval.22 Rather, in reviewing an agency’s decision 
for compliance with CEQA, “[t]h e court reviews the a dministrative record to 
determine whether the agency prejudicially abused its d iscretion.”23 “Abuse of 
discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by 
law, or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.”24  
Thus, the California Supreme Court has noted, that in the CEQA context, 
“[i]nsubstantial or merely technical omissions are not grounds for relief.”25 
However, a violation that undermines CEQA’s purpose may be considered 
prejudicial. Thus, where the adequacy of an EIR is chall enged, “[a] prejudicial 
abuse of discretion occurs if the failure to include relevant information precludes 
informed decision-making and informed public participation, thereby thwarting 
the statutory goals of the EIR process.”26 The requirement that CEQA violations 
“be prejudicial” underscores the importance of keeping CEQA’s purposes in mind 




21. Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC v. East Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 215 Cal. App. 4th 
353, 365 (2013); see also Kings Cty. Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 221 Cal. App. 3d 
692, 711 (1990) (“Although the purpose of CEQA is to compel government at all levels to 
make decisions with environmental consequences in mind, ‘CEQA does not, indeed cannot, 
guarantee that these de cisions will alwa ys be those wh ich favor environmental 
considerations.’”). 
22. See, e.g., Rominger v. Cty. of Colusa, 229 Cal. App. 4th 690, 709 (2014) (finding 
county abused its discretion by failing to comply with CEQA’s information disclosure 
requirements, but the abuse of discretion was not prejudicial). 
23. Gilroy Citizens for Responsible Planning v. City of Gilro y, 140 Cal. App. 4th 
911, 918 (2006) (emphasis added); see also Cal. Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21168, 21168.5 (1972). 
24. Ibid. 
25. Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Constr. Auth., 57 C al. 4th 
439, 463 (2013). 
26. Id. (emphasis added); see also Kings Cty. Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 221 
Cal. App. 3d 69 2, 711 (1990); Laurel Heigh ts Improvement Assn. v. Reg ents of Univ. of 
Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 404 (1988) (in finding abuse of discretion, California Supreme Court 
explained: “the EIR’s statutory goal of public information regarding a proposed project has 
not been met”) (emphasis added). 
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V. Courts have broad discretion to tailor a remedy addressing 
a prejudicial CEQA violation 
 
CEQA is not designed to be draconian. When a lead agency fails to comply 
with CEQA, the law does not require that project approvals or the relevant CEQA 
documents be set aside. Rather, as discussed below, CEQA generally provides 
courts with broad discretion to fashion a remedy that furthers CEQA’s purpose. 
 
A. Public Resources Code Section 21168.9 provides courts with broad 
discretion to fashion a narrowly tailored remedy that furthers CEQA’s 
purpose without unduly burdening development 
 
The judicial remedies for a CEQA violation are governed by section 21168.9 
of the Public Resources Code.27 This provision was initially enacted in 1984—
fourteen years after CEQA became law—to provide courts “with some flexibility 
in tailoring the remedy to the specific CEQA violation.”28 To provide courts with 
even more flexibility, section 21168.9 was amended in 1 993 to “expand the 
authority of courts to fashion a remedy that permits a part of the project to continue 
while the agency seeks to correct its CEQA violations.”29 
 
This flexibility allows courts to exercise substantial discretion in fashioning 
a remedy for a CEQA violation. For example, to remedy a CEQA violation, a court 
may: 
 
 issue a writ of mandate directing the public agency to void its approval of 
the project;30 
 allow project approvals and EIR certification to remain in place, but direct 
the public agency to take certain measures to comply with CEQA;31 
 allow project construction to proceed, except for those aspects of 
construction affected by the CEQA violation;32 or 
 
27. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9 (1972). 
28. POET, LLC v. California Air Resources Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 681, 756 (2013) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter POET I]. 
29. Id. (emphasis added). 
30. See, e.g., Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood, 45 Cal. 4th 116, 127-128 (2008); 
John R. Lawson Rock & Oil, Inc. v. State Air R es. Bd., 20 Cal. App. 5th 77, 10 2 (2018) 
(“Directing an agency to void its approval of the project is a typical remedy … for a CEQA 
violation”). 
31. See, e.g., POET I, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 756. 
32. See, e.g., Pres. Wild Santee v . City of Santee, 210 Cal. App. 4 th 260 (2012) ; 
Anderson First Coal. v. City of Anderson, 130 Cal. App. 4th 1173 (2005).  
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 rescind project approval and require the project, if con structed while 
CEQA litigation was pending, to be “modified, torn down, or eliminated 
to restore the property to its original condition.”33 
 
To understand how this range of outcomes is po ssible, one must look to 
Public Resources Code section 21168.9, which provides courts with discretion to 
narrowly tailor writs of mandate to fu lfill CEQA’s purposes without unduly 
obstructing the project. In particular, section 21168.9 provides, in its entirety:  
 
(a) If a court finds, as a result of a trial, hearing, or remand from 
an appellate court, that any d etermination, finding, or 
decision of a public agency has been made without 
compliance with [CEQA], the court shall enter an order that 
includes one or more of the following: 
 
(1) A mandate that the determination, finding, or decision 
be voided by the public agency, in whole or in part. 
 
(2) If the court finds that a sp ecific project activity or 
activities will p rejudice the consideration or 
implementation of particular mitigation measures or 
alternatives to the project, a mandate that the public 
agency and any real parties in interest suspend any or 
all specific project activity or activities, pursuant to the 
determination, finding, or decision, that could result in 
an adverse change or alteration to t he physical 
environment, until the public agency has taken any 
actions that may be necessary to bring the 
determination, finding, or decision into compliance 
with [CEQA]. 
 
(3) A mandate that the public agency take specific action 
as may be necessary to bring the determination, 
finding, or decision into compliance with [CEQA]. 
 
(b) Any order pursuant to subdivision (a) shall include only 
those mandates which are necessary to achieve compliance 
with [CEQA] and only those specific project activities in 
noncompliance with [CEQA]. The order shall be made by 
 
33. Woodward Park Homeowners Ass’n v. Garreks, Inc., 77 Cal. App. 4th 880, 889 
(2000). 
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the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate specifying 
what action by the public a gency is necessary to c omply 
with [CEQA]. However, the order shall be limited to that 
portion of a determination, finding, or decision or the 
specific project activity or activities found to be in 
noncompliance only if a court find s that (1) the portion or 
specific project activity or activities are sev erable, (2) 
severance will not prejudice complete and full compliance 
with [CEQA], and (3) the court has not found the remainder 
of the project to be in noncompliance with [CEQA]. The 
trial court shall retain jurisdiction over the public agency’s 
proceedings by way of a return to the peremptory writ until 
the court has determined that the public agency has 
complied with [CEQA]. 
 
(c) Nothing in this section authorizes a court to direct any public 
agency to ex ercise its d iscretion in an y particular way. 
Except as expressly provided in this section, nothing in this 
section is intended to limit the equitable powers of the 
court.34 
 
Section 21168.9 thus provides courts with broad discretion to fashion judicial 
remedies under CEQA. Accordingly, if a trial court determines that a C EQA 
document is inadequate in some but not all respects, the court need not necessarily 
direct the public agency to set aside its approvals of the CEQA document and the 
project in their entirety. Indeed, section 21168.9 repeatedly emphasizes that to the 
extent possible, judicial remedies should be narrowly tailored to further the 
purposes of CEQA. Notably: 
 
 Subsections (1), (2), and (3) of section 21168.9(a) are in the disjunctive.35 
For example, a court  may require a public agency to further review a 
potential environmental impact under section 21168.9(a)(3), without 
voiding any part of a project approval under section 21168.9(a)(1) and 
without suspending any project activity under section 21168.9(a)(2).36 
 
34. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9 (1972). 
35. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(a) (1972) (“the court shall enter  an order that 
includes one or more of the following . . .”) (emphasis added). 
36. See, e.g., POET, LLC v. State Air Res. Bd., 12 Cal. App. 5th 52 (2017)  
[hereinafter POET II]. 
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 Section 21168.9(a)(1) authorizes a court to direct a public agency to void 
its project approvals “in whole or in part.”37 
 Section 21168.9(a)(2) authorizes a cou rt to direct a public agency to 
suspend “any or all” specific project activities only if the court finds that 
such activity undermines CEQA’s basic purposes.38 
 Section 21168.9(b) emphasizes that judicial remedies under CEQA must 
be narrowly tailored, to the extent possible.39 
 Section 21168.9(c) underscores that courts may fashion remedies 
pursuant to their “equitable powers.”40 
 
Section 21168.9 thus does not require courts to set aside EIR certification or 
project approvals every tim e the court fi nds a CEQA violation. Rather, courts  
could—and should—craft narrow judicial remedies that further CEQA’s purpose 
without unduly obstructing project development.  
 
B. Courts have repeatedly used their discretion under Public Resources 
Code Section 21168.9 to leave portions of project approvals and EIR 
certifications in place despite finding CEQA noncompliance 
 
Many courts have used their discretion under Public Resources Code section 
21168.9 to fashion narrowly tailored remedies that permit at least portions of a 
project to proceed, despite finding that a public agency has failed to fully comply 
with CEQA.41 These decisions are a valuable example of how courts may balance 
the need to fulfill CEQA’s important purposes with California’s social, economic, 
and environmental interests. 
 
1. The following examples support allowing a project to proceed 
despite some CEQA noncompliance 
 
a) Court balanced CEQA compliance and continued 
development 
 
Anderson First Coalition v City of Anderson is an excellent example of a 
court narrowly tailoring its judicial remedy to ensure compliance with CEQA 
 
37. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(a)(1) (1972). 
38. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(a)(2) (1972). 
39. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(b) (1972) (court’s order “shall include only those 
mandates which are necessary to achieve compliance with [CEQA] and only those specific 
project activities in noncompliance with [CEQA]”) (emphasis added). 
40. Cal. Pub. Res. Code, § 21168.9(c) (1972). 
41. See, e.g., Anderson, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 1173. 
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without needlessly obstructing development.42 This case stemmed from the City of 
Anderson’s approval of a shopping center comprised of an 184,000 square-foot 
Wal-Mart Supercenter, three other commercial retail pads, and a gas station.43 The 
petitioner challenged the project’s approval on the basis that, among other things, 
the environmental impacts of the proposed gas station were not fully analyzed in 
the EIR.44 The trial court, pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21168.9, 
severed the gas station from the rest of the project and ordered the real parties in 
interest to suspend all activity on the gas station until its environmental impacts 
were properly analyzed.45 However, the court allowed construction and operation 
of the rest of the project to proceed.46 
The appellate court affirmed based on Public Resources Code section 
21168.9, subdivisions (a)(1) and (b).47 Specifically, the appellate court held that 
the gas station was properly severable from the remainder of the project where (1) 
the infirmities in the EIR were limited solely to impacts associated with the 
proposed gas station; (2) the construction and operation of the gas station were 
specific project activities severable from the remainder of the project; (3) severance 
of the gas station from the remainder of the project would not prejudice complete 
and full compliance with CEQA; and (4) the remainder of the project was in full 
compliance with CEQA.48 
The appellate court also rejected the petitioner’s argument that the severance 
remedy under Public Resources Code section 21168.9(b) “was originally designed 
to address only relatively minor matters of noncompliance with CEQA.”49 In 
rejecting the argument, Anderson noted that section 21168.9 was amended in 1993 
to expand the trial court’s authority to fashion a remedy, and that “the issuance of 







42. Anderson, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 1173. 
43. Id. at 1177. 
44. Id. at 1177–78. 
45. Id. at 1177–79. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 1179–80. 
48. Anderson, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 1180–81. 
49. Id. at 1181. 
50. Id. 
2_OUELLETTE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2018  10:51 AM 




b) POET, LLC v. California Air Resources Board and POET, 
LLC v. State Air Resources Board illustrate courts’ ability to 
balance CEQA compliance and project completion 
 
Both POET, LLC v. California Air Resources Bd., 218 Cal. App. 4th 681 
(2013) (“POET I”)51 and POET, LLC v. State Air Res. Bd., 12  Cal. App. 5th 52 
(2017) (“POET II”)52 illustrate the wide discretion that courts have to narrowly 
fashion judicial remedies that fulfill CEQA’s purposes without unduly obstructing 
a project. These cases stem from the California Air Resources Board’s (“CARB”) 
approval of low carbon fuel standard (“LCFS”) regulations pursuant to the 
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.53  
In POET I, the appellate court held that CARB violated CEQA in its approval 
of the regulations, ordered CARB to void its approval of LCFS regulations, and 
directed CARB to c orrect its CEQA vi olations.54 Despite voiding CARB’s 
approval of LCFS regulations, the court held that “the LCFS regulations should 
remain in operation so long as [CARB] is diligent in taking the action necessary to 
bring its approval of the project into compliance with CEQA.”55 Based on its 
interpretation of subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), (b), and (c) of Public Resources Code 
section 21168.9, POET I held that “a court’s decision to void the approval of a 
regulation, ordinance or program does not necessarily require the court to 
invalidate or suspend the operation of the regulation, ordinance or program.”56 
“Instead, in extraordinary cases, the c ourt may exercise its inhere nt equitable 
authority to maintain the status quo and allow the regulations to rem ain 
operative.”57 In deciding not to suspend the LCFS regulations, despite voiding their 
approval, the court emphasized the importance of crafting a judicial remedy that  
furthers CEQA’s purposes.58 In particular, the appellate court emphasized that 
leaving LCFS regulations in place provides more protection for the environment 
than suspending their operation pending CARB’s compliance with CEQA.59 
POET II addressed whether CARB satisfied the writ of mandate issued after 
POET I and corrected its CEQA violations.60 The appellate court held that CARB 
failed to comply with the previously issued writ of mandate and that its attempt to 
 
51. POET I, 218 Cal. App. 4th 681 (2013). 
52. POET II, 12 Cal. App. 5th 52 (2017). 
53. Id. at 56-57. 
54. POET I, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 760. 
55. Id. at 763. 
56. Id. at 761. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 758, 762. 
59. Id. at 762. 
60. POET II, 12 Cal. App. 5th at 57. 
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comply with the writ was not in good faith.61 Despite this, the appellate court did 
not suspend the LCFS regulations.62 Instead, the appellate court held, once again, 
that the beneficial effects of the regulations outweighed their potential adverse 
impacts.63 In reaching this conclusion, the court again underscored that judicial 
remedies under CEQA should further CEQA’s purposes, explaining that “the goals 
of CEQA should not be compromised to punish agency bad faith.”64 
 
2. LandValue 77, LLC v. Board of Trustees of California State 
University held that a project approval must be set aside if any 
portion of the EIR fails to comply with CEQA, but subsequent 
cases rejected this holding 
 
Despite the overwhelming textual evidence that judicial remedies under 
CEQA should be narrowly tailored, LandValue 77, LLC v. Board of Trustees of 
California State University65 held that a publ ic agency must set aside all project 
approvals and the certification of the EIR, where the court finds that an EIR is 
inadequate in some, but not all, respects.66 
LandValue 77 involved a challenge to the approval of a m ixed-use 
development project and the EIR certification for that project.67 The trial court 
determined the EIR inadequately analyzed three limited environmental impacts of 
the proposed project.68 Nonetheless, the trial court did not require decertification 
of the entire EIR and did not overturn the entire project approval.69 The appellate 
court reversed, holding that “the trial court’s determination that the final EIR was 
inadequate in certain respects requires an order directing the Board of Trustees to 
set aside its certification of the final EIR as well as its approval of the project.”70  
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court (1) noted that the trial court 
did not sever the project under Public Resources Code section 21168.9(b), and (2) 
relied on a treatise, wh ich addressed the application of section 21168.9 when a 
project has not been severed.71 The treatise provides that when a trial court has not 
severed a project pursuant to section 21168.9(b), and the EIR is inadequate in some 
 
61. POET II, 12 Cal. App. 5th at 100. 
62. Id. at 101-02. 
63. Id. at 101. 
64. Id. (emphasis added). 
65. LandValue 77, LLC v. Board of Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 193 Cal. App. 4th 
675, (2011). 
66. Id. at 681–83. 
67. Id. at 677. 
68. Id. at 678. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 683. 
71. LandValue 77, 193 Cal. App. 4th 675 at 681–82. 
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respect, the local age ncy must set as ide all project approvals and the EIR 
certification in its entirety.72 
The appellate court relied on this treatise, but ultimately reached a conclusion 
that was more extreme than what was expressed in the treatise. In particular, the 
appellate court categorically “reject[ed] the idea of partial certification” of an  
EIR.73 The court explained that “[t]he statutes and CEQA Guidelines provide for 
the certification of an EIR when it is complete, and the concept of completeness is 
not compatible with partial certification. In short, an EIR is either complete or it is 
not.”74 The court then held that when an EIR is leg ally inadequate, the project 
approvals must be set aside.75 
Subsequent cases have—with good cause—expressly disagreed with 
LandValue 77’s holding. In Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee, the appellate 
court expressly rejected the argument that “whenever a trial court finds an EIR 
inadequate, the trial co urt must decertify the EIR a nd vacate all related project 
approvals.”76 Preserve Wild Santee explained “a reasonable, commonsense reading 
of section 21168.9 plainly forecloses plaintiffs’ assertion that a t rial court must 
mandate a public agency decertify the EIR and void all related project approvals in 
every instance where the court finds an EIR violates CEQA.”77 The appellate court 
held that “[s]uch a rigid requirement directly conflicts with the “in part” language 
in section 21168.9, subdivision (a)(1), which specifically allows a court to direct 
its mandates to “parts of determinations, parts of findings, or parts of decisions.”78 
The appellate court further held that “[s]uch a rigid requirement also conflicts with 
the language in section 21168.9, subdivision (b), limiting the court’s mandate to 
only those necessary to achieve CEQA compliance and, if the court makes 
specified findings, to only ‘that portion of a determination, finding, or decision’ 
violating CEQA.”79 Moreover, Preserve Wild Santee expressly dis missed 
LandValue 77’s contrary conclusion on the basis that both LandValue 77 and the 
treatise it relied on ignored the “in part” language of section 21168.9(a)(1).80 
More recently, the appellate court in Center for Biological Diversity v. 
Department of Fish & Wildlife81 examined both LandValue 77 and Preserve Wild 
Santee, and ultimately agreed wi th the reasoning and holding of Preserve Wild 
 
72. LandValue 77, 193 Cal. App. 4th 675 at 681–82. 
73. Id. at 682. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 683. 
76. Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee, 210 Cal. App. 4th 260, 286 (2012). 
77. Id. at 288. 
78. Id. 
79. Id.  
80. Id. at 289. 
81. Center for Biological Divers ity v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 17 Cal. App. 5th 
1245 (2017). 
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Santee.82 In Center for Biological Diversity, the trial court found the EIR defective 
as to certai n issues, and iss ued a writ directing the public agency to, (1) void 
portions—not all—of the EIR; (2) enjoin all project activity until the EIR complied 
with CEQA; and (3) suspend two of the six approvals for the project.83 The issue 
was whether section 21168.9 prohibits pa rtial decertification of an EIR, and 
whether project approvals m ay be left in place after the  EIR for the project is 
decertified. In agreeing with Preserve Wild Santee, the appellate court noted that 
section 21168.9 “clearly allows a court to  order partial decertification of an EIR” 
as long as, pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 21168.9, the court determines that 
the voided portions are severable and that the remainder of the EIR fully complies 
with CEQA.84 Center for Biological Diversity further distinguished LandValue 77 
on the basis that the trial court in that case did not determine that the project was 
severable under Public Resources Code section 21168.9(b).85 Moreover, Center for 
Biological Diversity explained that under subdivision (b) of section 21168.9, “if 
the court finds that it will not prejudice full compliance with CEQA to leave some 
project approvals in place, it must leave them unaffected.”86  
The reasoning in Preserve Wild Santee and Center for Biological Diversity 
appears to have a stronger statutory basis than the court’s reasoning in LandValue 
77. As evidenced by Preserve Wild Santee, Center for Biological Diversity, 
Anderson, and the POET cases, CEQA affirmatively requires a court to narrowly 
fashion a judicial remedy consistent with section 21168.9, particularly when the 
project is severable. Still, as LandValue 77 illustrates, ambiguity exists. Reform of 
Public Resources Code section 21168.9 is warranted to remove ambiguity and to 
make clear that judicial remedies under CEQA should be tailored as narrowly as 
possible to further CEQA’s purposes without unduly obstructing projects from 
proceeding forward. 
 
VI. Recommendations for reform of Public Resources Code 
Section 21168.9 
 
Public Resources Code section 21168.9 is relatively well-drafted and 
provides courts with valuable discretion to narrowly tailor remedies effectuating 
CEQA’s purposes. Nonetheless, this article suggests three ways to reform section 
21168.9—or State CEQA Guidelines implementing section 21168.9—to ensure 
that remedies further CEQA’s purposes without needless collateral damage. 
 
82. Center for Biological Diversity, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 1253–54. 
83. Id. at 1251. 
84. Id. at 1252. 
85. Id. at 1254. 
86. Id. at 1255. 
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First, section 21168.9 could be amended to codify the holdings of POET I 
and POET II.87 Specifically, section 21168.9 or State CEQA Guidelines could be 
amended to (1) explicitly encourage courts to fashion equitable remedies to address 
a CEQA violation where the court determines that such a remedy furthers CEQA’s 
purpose; and (2) provide that an agency may proceed with a project, or individual 
project activities, during the remand period where the court has exercised its 
equitable discretion to perm it project activities to proceed during that period.88 
Moreover, State CEQA Guidelines could be amended to advise that project 
approvals should remain in place where, as i n the POET cases, the environment 
will be given a greater level of pro tection if the project remains operative during 
the remand period. These revisions would further CEQA’s goal of protecting the 
environment, while also easing the burden on public  agencies to approve 
regulations, ordinances, general plans, or similar items. 
Second, section 21168.9 could be amended to limit a co urt’s authority to 
vacate project approvals unless the court finds that failure to vacate the approvals 
would result in an imminent threat of actual environmental damage. This 
encourages courts to su spend—rather than vacate—project approvals until the 
public agency takes all necessary action to comply with CEQA.89  
Third, section 21168.9 could be amended to codify existing case law  and 
make clear that application of its judicial  remedies is appropriate only where t he 
court finds a prejudicial violation of CEQA.90 Again, this would ensure that the 
application of judicial remedies under section 21168.9 furthers CEQA’s purposes, 
rather than unduly obstructs a project.  
These reforms, if adopted, would further define the extensive discretion of 
courts to fashion narrowly tailored remedies that a dvance CEQA’s purposes 
without unnecessarily obstructing development. Ultimately, CEQA is not perfect, 
and these recommended reforms will not solve everything. The process of tinkering 
with CEQA t o further its environmental and in formational purposes without 
unduly hindering development is a tightrope that legislators will likely walk for as 






87. POET I, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 760-63; POET II, 12 Cal. App. 5th at 100–101. 
88. OFFICE OF PLAN. & RES., PROPOSED UPDATES TO THE  CEQA GUIDELINES 
(November 2017), https://perma.cc/96KX-GRQ4 (Proposing updates to the State CEQA 
Guidelines, including the addition of § 15234 memorializing the outcome of POET I). 
89. See Center for Biological Diversity, 17 C al. App. 5th at 1251 (suspending—
rather than vacating—two of six project approvals). 
90. See, e.g., Neighbors for Smart Rail, 57 Cal. 4th at 463.  
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Governor Jerry Brown may have referred to CEQA reform as “the L ord’s 
work,” but CEQA itself serves an important purpose in protecting the environment 
and keeping both decision makers and the public informed.91 When a court finds 
that a public agency has violated CEQA, Public Resources Code section 21168.9 
gives the court discretion to narrowly tailor judicial remedies to further CEQA’s 
important purposes, without unduly obstructing proposed projects and 
development. CEQA reform should not compromise CEQA’s important purpose, 
but rather ensure that its purpose is  achieved while minimizing unnecessary 
obstacles to development. 
 
91. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 15002(a); see also Golden Gate Landholdings, 215 Cal. 
App. 4th at 365. 
